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The newly emergent landowners in the 1990s left their land in the corporate farms due to the 
low level of farm profitability and the high risk in the general economic environment. The 
accession  to  the  EU  and  the  introduction  of  the  CAP  Single  Area  Payment  (SAP)  could 
induce incentives to landowners to withdraw their land if they are not satisfied with the level 
of  rent.  The  negotiations  between  the  corporate  farm  managers  and  the  landowners 
concerning the rent level have been conceptualised as a simple two-player one-shot game. 
Overall conclusion is that although the SAP might induce more landowners to ask for a rent 
increase, it is unlikely that they will massively withdraw their land from the corporate farms. 
However, financially constrained farms might quickly loose their capacity to compete for land 
in the conditions of an increased land demand.  
 




1   INTRODUCTION 
On the basis of theoretical arguments concerning the superior efficiency of family farming, 
many  predicted  the  disappearance  of  co-operatives  and  other  large  corporate  farms,  as 
variations  in  productivity  would  lead  to  a  wholesale  transfer  to  individual  farming  (for  a 
summary of the debate, see Gorton and Davidova, 2004). Empirical evidence on changing 
farm structures in Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) indicates that during the 
period of transition the corporate sector’s role in agriculture has shrunk but in many CEECs 
the  sector  has  survived  and  proved  to  be  competitive  under  market  conditions.  The 
uncertainty  is  to  what  extent  the  corporate  farms  would  be  resilient  to  the  new  policy 
environment after the accession to the EU and the introduction of the CAP decoupled Single 
Area Payment (SAP). The landowners who left their land within the corporate farms could 
now  cash  the  SAP  themselves,  providing  they  keep  their  land  in  good  agricultural  and 
environmental conditions (GAEC). They, therefore, have more incentives to withdraw their 
land from the corporate farms putting the future of those farms, who rent almost 100 percent 
of  their  land,  at  stake.  This  paper  attempts  to  provide  some  insights  into  the  future  of 
corporate farming under the CAP payments. The case study country is Slovakia as there the 
extent of land use by corporate farms is still the highest among NMS. In 2005, the share of 
corporate farms in the total UAA was 85 per cent (Green Report, 2006). This is high even in 
comparison with the Czech Republic where the pre-transition structures were similar.  
2  WHY DID THE CORPORATE FARMS PERSIST DURING THE TRANSITION? 
Several reasons have been identified as responsible for the persistence of corporate farms in 
Slovakia  during  the  period  of  transition.  They  include  low  profitability  and  low  level  of 
incomes  in  agriculture,  a  decline  in  domestic  demand  and  a  loss  of  export  market  share, 
deteriorating  internal  terms  of  trade,  a  lack  of  input  market  infrastructure  and  output 
marketing channels for individual producers (Blaas, 2002). Other reasons were the protracted 
identification of land titles (currently still about 500,000 hectares of land lack clear ownership 
titles), fragmentation of land ownership and the very slow land consolidation process.  
Mathijs and Swinnen (1998) elaborated a series of propositions to explain the decisions of 
individuals to exit from the corporate farms and start an individual venture. They asserted the   2 
assumption that the corporate farms’ insiders would be the agents who would undermine the 
corporate  farms  and  establish  a  new  pattern  of  family  farm  structures.  According  to  our 
observation, more significant actors who established new individual entities were the absentee 
landowners – the persons who received land in the process of restitution. Among the insiders, 
only those with skills, e.g. the former co-op managers, tended towards individual farming. 
The latter corroborates with Swinnen´s suggestion about the importance of skills for reducing 
the  exit  costs.  Empirical  evidence,  collected  through  farm  surveys,  indicated  that  other 
“insiders”, co-op farm members, did not possess the proper pre-conditions for starting an 
individual business (Blaas, 1995). Only less than one-third of the co-op members owned land 
or were expecting to inhered land. Only a small portion owned a land area sufficient for a full-
time farming. The majority of those co-op members, who were landowners (57 percent), had 
only 5 or less hectares.  
Mathijs  and  Swinnen  (1998)  suggested  that  the  higher  productivity  enterprises  under  the 
corporate farming conditions would stimulate farm workers to stay within the corporate farms 
whilst  the  low  productivity  will  make  the  exit  to  individual  farming  more  attractive.  In 
Slovakia,  individual  farms  which  emerged  through  withdrawing  land  and  non-land  assets 
from  the  collective  farms  were  mainly  specialised  in  crops,  whilst  livestock  production 
remained  within  the  corporate  farms.  The  drive  towards  individual  farming  avoided 
specialisation in labour and capital intensive sub-sectors.  
Institutional, and particularly the legal framework, has been a crucial factor for the outcome 
of  the  transformation  process.  Mathijs  and  Swinnen  (1998)  argued  that  the  restitution  to 
former owners will maintain the collective farm structure and the outcome will be in contrast 
with the effects of the land distribution amongst farm workers. In Slovakia (and also in the 
Czech Republic) the restitution was the main policy option for reinstating private property 
rights in land, This differed from, e.g. Hungary, where there was a combination of distribution 
of land to the co-operative members, compensation for lost property and restitution to the 
former  owners.  As  a  results  the  role  of  the  corporate  sector  in  Hungary  decreased  more 
substantially than in Slovakia or the Czech Republic. 
Mathijs and Swinnen (1977) also argued that countries and regions with highly fragmented 
land record a higher sustainability of corporate farms. Historically, the land ownership in 
Slovakia was more fragmented than in the Czech lands due to the different inheritance law 
before WW I. At the beginning of the collectivisation period (1949) 57 percent of all farms in 
Slovakia ranged between 2 and 5 hectares and 72 percent of the total land area was operated 
by farms with 20 and less hectares (Blaas, 2002). According to the land register, currently 
there are more than 1.2 million owners who own more than 7 million plots. To establish a 
farm business of economically reasonable size requires in most cases enormous transaction 
costs. 
Coming back to the title of our seminar, the theoretical propositions about the outcome of 
land reform and farm restructuring in Central and Eastern Europe during transition, developed 
in the 1990s, were able to predict some of the country variations in the mix of farm structures.  
3  WHAT CAN CHANGE UNDER CAP SAP? 
As indicated in the previous section, several factors influenced the landowners’ decision to 
leave  the  land  within  the  corporate  farms.  However,  this  situation  might  change  as  the 
landowners can now cash the Single Area Payment (SAP) themselves, providing they keep 
their land in good agricultural and environmental conditions (GAEC). They therefore have 
more incentives to withdraw their land from the corporate farms putting the future of those 
farms, who rent almost 100 percent of their land, at stake.   3 
The main conflict that could undermine the long-term existence of corporate farms under the 
CAP  SAP  concerns  the  distributional  issues  that  may  arise  in  relation  to  the  way  profit 
(including  the  CAP  payments)  will  be  distributed  between  rentals,  dividends,  wages  and 
investment. As noted by Brem and Kim (2000), a corporate farm can be considered as an 
economic organisation consisting of different interest groups (the various stakeholders) who 
bargain  on  the  objectives  of  this  organisation:  landowners,  capital  holders,  workers  and 
managers. The separation of ownership and control might induce managers to fulfil objectives 
that are not the other stakeholders’ objectives, such as increasing the farm’s size (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976; Williamson, 1983). 
As the CAP payments are allocated to the farm holdings, their use is at the discretion of the 
corporate farm managers. The latter have several options, such as using the payments for the 
current  business  operations,  for  investment,  for  repayment  of  debts  or  for  increasing  the 
payments  to  the  various  stakeholders.  Since  it  is  assumed  that  the  managers  derive  an 
increasing utility from the farm growth, they might prefer to use the payments for the farming 
business. Therefore, the CAP payments might exacerbate the conflicts between the managers 
and  the  other  stakeholders  within  corporate  farms  regarding  the  use  of  profit.  If  the 
landowners are not satisfied with the level of rent they receive from the farm, they have the 
option  to  end  their  rental  contract  and  withdraw  their  land  from  the  farm.  The  ease,  or 
otherwise, to do this depends on the tenancy legislation in each country, the time period of the 
contract,  when  and  how  the  lease  may  be  terminated,  and  the  requirements  for  notice  of 
termination.  
4   THEORETICAL  REPRESENTATION  OF  THE  CONFLICTS  BETWEEN  THE  CORPORATE 
FARMS AND THEIR LANDOWNERS 
4.1   Description of the game 
In corporate farms landowners have three options available concerning the returns on their 
land. The first option is the status quo, that is to say to keep the land in the farm for the same 
rent. The second option is to ask for a rent increase and the third one is to withdraw the land 
from the corporate farms. Landowners will choose option two if they are not happy with the 
current level of the rent and option three if the rent renegotiation has been unsuccessful. As 
the negotiations between corporate farm managers and landowners about the level of rent are 
at the core of the issue, game theory has been employed as a framework to aid in generating 
prior expectations.  In order to  ease the understanding of how the propositions have been 
generated, a simple game is used (for more details see Latruffe and Davidova, 2007).  
The game includes two representative players, the manager and a landowner, and is a non-
cooperative  static  one.  The  negotiation  process  is  one-shot;  the  manager  (F)  and  the 
landowner (L) meet together once to decide about the level of the rent and make simultaneous 
offers. It is assumed that only two offers are possible, a low rent, that is the rent usually paid 
to the landowners, and a high rent, that includes an increase following the renegotiation. Both 
players have thus two possible actions: offering, respectively asking for, low rent and high 
rent. If both players choose the same action, they reach an agreement and the landowner rents 
the land out to the farm for the specific rent level agreed upon. If the rent is low rent, the 
outcome is thus “no change”, while if the rent is high, the outcome is “rent increase”. If the 
farm’s  manager  proposes  a  high  rent  while  the  landowner  asks  for  a  low  rent,  it  is 
straightforward to assume that there is an agreement on renting the land at a high rent and the 
outcome is “rent increase”. Finally, if the farm’s manager offers a low rent but the landowner 
asks for a high rent, there is no agreement and the rental contract is ended; the outcome is 
“land withdrawal” (Figure 1).   4 
The  landowner’s  choice  of  action  depends  on  whether  they  have  a  better  opportunity 
elsewhere.  This  is  modelled  here  by  introducing  two  types  of  landowners.  Type  1  (with 
probability p) is a landowner who has a better opportunity for the land outside the corporate 
farm and who represents a credible threat of withdrawal, while type 2 (probability 1–p) does 
not. There is asymmetric information about the landowners’ type. Although managers have 
information  about  the  plots’  characteristics,  they  are  not  fully  informed  about  their 
landowners’ values and situation, as most of them are absentees landowners living in cities. 
The farm manager prefers to give a low rent than a high rent, but the land withdrawal is costly 
for the farm as it reduces the area farmed and consequently decreases the revenue and farm 
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Landowners prefer a high rent to a low rent. But if the payoffs of a withdrawal for type 1 
(credible threat) are greater than the payoffs of continuing renting land to the farm for low 
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rent high P > P > P   (3) 
Players  choose  to  play  the  strategy  that  maximises  their  payoff.  The  type  1  landowner’s 
strongly dominant strategy is high rent and it will be played by them regardless of what might 
be played by the opponent (Rasmusen, 1994).  Similarly, the type 2 landowner’s strongly 
dominant strategy is to ask for a low rent in order to avoid the termination of the rental 
contract. There is no dominant strategy for the manager, but a set of two best responses: low 
rent if the landowner plays low rent, and high rent if the landowner asks for it. If there was no 
information asymmetry, then the manager would know which action would be taken by the 
other party. Therefore, in the case of a type 1 (credible threat) landowner, land would be 
rented for a high rent, while in the case of a type 2 (no credible threat) landowner, land would 
be rented for a low rent. This means that, in reality, if the manager had information about the 
landowner’s type, the land would stay within the corporate farm. If the manager could not 
identify  the  opponent’s  type,  it  is  assumed  that  they  have  some  beliefs  about  the  prior 
probability of the landowner’s types, p and (1–p). Therefore, they will play the strategy that 
brings the greater of the possible expected payoffs. Hence, all three outcomes are possible but 
their frequency depends on the value of the probability p. 
So far, however, the whole game has been based on the assumption that the corporate farm is 
able to offer the two levels of rent. If the farm is financially constrained and cannot afford a 
rent increase, in the case of a type 2 landowner (no credible threat) the solution will still be to 
rent the land for low rent, but in the case of a type 1 (credible threat) the solution will be 
withdrawal. In summary, the frequency of each of the three outcomes depends on the level of 
the probability p and of the farm financial constraints. The smaller the p, the more frequent is 
the outcome “no change”. The more financially constrained the farms are, the more frequent 
are the outcomes “no change” and “land withdrawal”.   5 
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N: Nature. F: corporate farm’s manager. L: landowner. 
Landowner 2: with no 
opportunities for land 
(probability 1-p) 
Landowner 1: with 
opportunities for land 
(probability p)         
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4.2   Propositions about the effect of the CAP SAP 
Proposition 1: Before the implementation of the CAP the outcome “no change” was more 
frequent than the outcomes “rent increase” and “land withdrawal”. 
The outcome “no change” prevailed as many farms were financially constrained due to the 
low  profitability  or  loss-making  (by  the  same  token  most  landowners  had  no  better 
alternatives to receive higher returns on their land outside the corporate farm). 
Proposition  2:  After  the  implementation  of  the  CAP  the  frequency  of  the  outcome  “no 
change” will decrease. 
Proposition 3: After the implementation of the CAP the outcome “withdraw land” will not be 
more frequent than the other two outcomes “no change and “rent increase”. 
It is proposed that the frequency of the outcome “no change” might decrease as, following the 
CAP implementation, p will increase as more landowners might be able to make a credible 
threat of withdrawal due to an increased demand for land. Also, the SAP delivered without 
attached requirements to produce might give incentives to landowners to manage their land 
themselves if the profit from it (taking into consideration the cross-compliance costs) were to 
exceed the rent they receive in the corporate farms. Hence, it can be expected that more 
landowners will want to change their situation and renegotiate their rent. However, despite an 
increase in rent renegotiations, withdrawals are not expected to be massive for two reasons. 
First, the introduction of the SAP is expected to relax farm financial constraints and thus more 
farms  will  be  able  to  offer  a  high  rent.  Second,  the  probability  p  will  not  increase 
dramatically, meaning that the overall number of landowners with credible threat will not rise 
considerably in the next few years. This will be due in part to the typical small scale land 
ownership in Slovakia and the relatively low direct payments per hectare due to the phasing-
in.  If  the  landowners  contemplate  to  withdraw  land  for  individual  management,  the  SAP 
might not be enough to offset the costs of cross-compliance (under the assumption that the 
cross-compliance  will  be  properly  enforced  and  monitored).  The  other  reason  is  that  the 
landowners, most of whom are absentee, might still prefer to have their land managed by 
somebody else and often the corporate farm is the obvious choice. 
5  SURVEY OF CORPORATE FARMS 
5.1  Structure of the questionnaire 
The survey of corporate farms in Slovakia was carried out within the frame of the EU FP6 
IDEMA project. The questionnaire attempted to account for the specificity of corporate farms 
with their complex organisation involving several stakeholders. In order to understand which 
are the stakeholders that would mainly benefit from the SAP, questions were first asked about 
the current farm decision-making characteristics (number of members/partners, directors and 
managers, voting procedure). Then the respondents were asked how the farm profit used to be 
allocated  and  how  they  intend  to  allocate  it  in  the  future  amongst  the  alternative  needs 
(working capital, investment/interest, dividends and land rentals). In order to have a better 
understanding of the structural farm characteristics, the surveyed farms were matched with 
their FADN entries averaged for 2001/2002. 
One section of the farm questionnaire focused on the potential conflicts between the farms’ 
managers and their landowners from the point of view of the farm management. The first 
questions aimed at collecting information about the characteristics of the landowners (e.g. 
individuals, state, municipality), the area rented, the rent level and the terms of the contract. 
Information was collected on whether some of the landowners had asked for a rent increase in         
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the past, or withdrew some land, and whether the corporate farm management knew whether 
their  landowners  had  been  offered  a  higher  rent  outside  the  corporate  farm.  Finally,  the 
questionnaire asked about the opinion of the corporate farms’ respondents on the potential 
behaviour of their landowners in the context of the introduction of the CAP payments. 
The survey respondents were asked to state their role in the farm (director, manager or other), 
as this might induce some bias in the answers. Face-to-face interviews were carried out and 
152  corporate  farms  were  interviewed  in  Slovakia,  including  101  cooperatives  and  51 
companies. 
5.2. Analysis of the survey responses 
Relation with the landowners 
Table 1 presents information about the rented land. As the rent level is a key variable in the 
analysis, it is presented in the table based on two sources – FADN and the farm survey. 
The farms have hundreds of private landowners owning on average 68 percent of the total 
land rented in by the sample farms. On average 24 percent of the land is rented from the State 
and the remaining 8 percent from the Church and municipalities. The average rent indicated 
by both FADN records and respondents is consistent, about 14 Euro per ha (the cooperatives 
pay a lower rent than the companies). 
Table 1: Characteristics of the sample farms concerning their rented land 






FADN 2002 data 
Average UAA (ha)  1,866  1,904  1,791 
Average rent per ha (euro)  14.3  12.9  17.0 
Data from the survey 
Average share of land rented from: 















Average number of private landowners  789  877  612 
















Average rent per ha: 
Private landowners (euro) 










Time period of contract 
Notice for contract termination 
In general 5 or 10 years 
In general 1 year 
In the past, about one third of the farms have had requests for a rent increase, but by only 8 
percent of their landowners (Table 2). Among these farms, 39 percent increased the rent; the 
remaining refused justifying their refusal by financial constraints. On average 3 percent of the 
sample  farm  UAA  was  withdrawn  accounting  for  about  2  ha  per  landowner.  The  large 
majority of the individuals who withdrew land wanted to start their own farm. The fact that 
only few landowners asked for a rent increase or withdrew land, as stated by the corporate 
farms’ respondents, supports Proposition 1 concerning the prevalence of the status quo in the 
past. Comparing the legal forms, the main difference is that more companies (63 percent) than 
cooperatives (25 percent) accepted the requests for a rent increase. This might be explained by 
the larger returns generated by companies, which made them more flexible.          
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Table 2: Past pressures on privately rented land (% in brackets) 






Requests for a rent increase 
Farms that had requests for a rent 
increase 
51 (34)  32 (32)  19 (37) 
Landowners who requested a rent 
increase 
48 (8)  48 (5)   49(12) 
Reason given by landowners for the 
request 
able to get higher rent elsewhere; heard that other landowner had an 
increase 
Farms that accepted to increase the 
rent 
a 
20 (39)  8 (25)  12 (63) 
Financial constraint used by the  
farms for refusing the request 
75  70  87 
Land withdrawals 
Farms who experienced 
withdrawals 
89 (59)  62 (61)  27 (53) 
Landowners who withdrew  27 (3.5)  27 (3.6)  25 (3.4) 
Total UAA withdrawn from the 
farm; ha (% of UAA) 
52 (3)  56 (3.5)  42 (1.9) 
Justification of withdrawal by the 
start of own farm 
85  82  93 
a In brackets: as a percentage of farms having had requests for a rent increase. 
Corporate farms’ respondents were then asked to give their opinion on the possible future 
pressures. As presented in Table 3, three quarters of the respondents expect some request for a 
rent increase, but few of them believe that land withdrawals will take place. This also supports 
Propositions  2  and  3  that  the  status  quo  option  will  be  less  frequent  in  future  but  that 
withdrawals of land from the corporate farms will not be massive. However, if this is true on 
average, financially constrained farms may quickly loose their capacity to compete for land in 
the conditions of increased demand which has started being observed in the NMS after the EU 
accession. Therefore, a substantial structural change might be expected within the corporate 
farm sector with a better allocation of land to the more efficient users.  
Table 3: Sample farms’ expectations about their landowners’ future behaviour (%) 






Share of farms that expect SAP to induce 
more requests for a rent increase 
76  75  77 
Share of farms that expect SAP to induce 
more land withdrawals 
20  20  20 
Farms whose respondents do not think that the SAP will change their landowners’ behaviour 
have already had a larger share of rentals in their cost of production structure (2.6 percent 
against 1.9 percent for the remaining sample farms). Farms whose respondents believe that 
the  SAP  will  give  incentives  to  their  landowners  to  withdraw  rather  than  ask  for  a  rent 
increase  are  more  often  located  in  unfavourable  areas,  have  already  experienced  more 
withdrawals  in  the  past  and  have  a  larger  share  of  individual  landowners  in  their  land 
portfolio.  
However, landowners are only one of the stakeholders in the corporate farms. The overall 
profit allocation provides a broader picture involving the interests of other stakeholders as 
well. 
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Past and intended future farm profit allocation 
As shown in Table 4, in the past the profit was used, first, to finance the current expenses, and 
second, for investment. The increase of rental payments was the least used option by the 
sample farms. This confirms the above findings that few farms accepted their landowners’ 
requests for a rent increase on the grounds that they could not afford it. This is also consistent 
with the theoretical argument that when the control and ownership are separated, managers 
may have an agenda of their own, often different from the one of the factor owners.  
The respondents were also asked to rank the same options from the least probable to the most 
probable in future, taking in consideration the SAP.  It appears that there is a strong past 
dependency; the preferences for the future appear to be similar to the past. The most favoured 
option is to finance the farm current operations, followed by investment. The increasing of the 
land rent is still the least preferred option. 
Table 4: Past and future use of profit by the sample farms 






Profit used for: 
(% of respondents who answered yes to an option) 
Farm current operations  63  64  61 
Investment  50  46  59 
Dividends  20  18  24 
Land rent increase  5  6  2 
Other  18  19  18 
Profit will be used for: 
(% of respondents who ranked an option as most probable) 
Farm current operations  71  71  69 
Investment  24  26  22 
Land rent increase  1  6  0 
Other  4  3  6 
ANOVA  was  carried  out  to  disentangle  the  farm  characteristics  that  may  explain  the 
variations in the farms’ decisions regarding the distribution of their profit. The results suggest 
that those farms which in the past did not allocate any profit to investment have a higher share 
of livestock production in their output mix and they are farms that did not benefit much from 
the investment subsidies. This tends to suggest that some of the variations were induced by 
policies which may have stimulated investments in certain types of production. These farms 
are also smaller measured by the land area and pay a lower rent to their landowners. The only 
significant difference between the cohorts of farms that used part of their profit to increase the 
land rent and the farms that did not allocate any profit to rent increases lies in the type of 
owners (credible threat of land withdrawal) and the managers’ information about the type of 
landowners. Forty three percent of farms that used some profit for rent increases knew that 
some of their landowners had been offered a higher rent outside the corporate farms (this 
percentage is 18 amongst the farms that did not increase the rents). Regarding the intended 
future use of farm profit, farms that are less likely to reinvest profits have received a smaller 
amount  of  investment  subsidies  in  the  past  (7.1  against  25.4  thousand  Euro).  Farms  that 
intend to allocate some of their profit to rent increases in the future have received in the past 
more other (i.e. not investment) subsidies per ha, which suggests that they might be less 
financially constrained.  
An  interesting  policy  insight  is  provided  by  the  study  of  the  relation  between  the  farm 
intentions for a future use of profit and their beliefs (or otherwise) in the irreversibility of         
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decoupling. It is proposed that farm intentions concerning their future use of profit depend on 
whether farm managers/directors believe that the decoupling is a sustainable policy or they 
expect another policy switch, either towards coupled payments or to a full removal of farm 
support. First, the farms have been clustered according to the three credibility statements that 
were included in the questionnaire. The respondents were asked to rate these statements. The 
possible ratings were from 1 “Not probable at all” to 6 “Very probable”. The statements 6.1.1 
and 6.1.2 suggest respectively that the policy change towards a decrease in sectoral support 
and a move to less distortive instruments is credible, while the statement 6.1.3 suggests that 
the policy is not credible. A two-step cluster analysis based on likelihood was performed on 
the three credibility statements with the number of clusters restricted to three (Table 5). The 
Cluster “no payments” includes the farms which consider that the probability of full removal 
of payments is high (a high rating of the statement 6.1.2). The farms in the other two clusters 
think  that  payments  are  more  likely  to  remain,  but  as  decoupled,  Cluster  “decoupled 
payments” (a high rating of the statement 6.1.1), or that policy will revert to coupling, Cluster 
“coupled payments” (a high rating of the statement 6.1.3). 














6.1.1. Payments decoupled from production but 
conditional on other service provision will be 
maintained. 
4.7  2.9  2.3 
6.1.2. Farmers will receive no support payments what 
so ever.  2.0  4.9  1.6 
6.1.3. Payments will be recoupled to agricultural 
production.  2.8  3.9  5.2 
 
The use of these clusters to investigate the differences in intended future profit allocation is 
presented in Table 6. Farms that do not think the decoupled payments are credible are more 
likely to use their profit for investment and less likely to use it for current operations. This 
means that they do not intend to change their behaviour as they think that the decoupled 
payments  and  the  option  to  receive  payments  simply  by  keeping  the  land  in  GAEC  are 
temporary  policy  instruments.  The  expectations  for  payments  linked  to  production  create 
incentives for investing. Concerning the use of profit for a rent increase, the farms that believe 
in the irreversibility of the 2003 CAP reform and the continuation of decoupled payments are 
more  likely  to  give  priority  to  land  rentals  in  comparison  with  the  farms  expecting  the 
payments to be re-coupled or to disappear all together. This might indicate a perceived danger 
of landowners’ withdrawals under decoupling when they can cash the payment themselves 
without the need to be engaged in production activities. 
Table 6: Intended future use of profit by the sample farms according to their perception 
about policy credibility 
  Cluster “decoupled 
payments” 
(88 farms)  
Cluster “no   
payments” 
(37 farms) 





















a Farms are classified as giving priority to a particular option if they ranked the option as the most probable (rank 
1) for investment and current operations, and the most or relatively probable (ranks 1 and 2) for a rent increase.         
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6   CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
The  widespread  existence  of  corporate  farms  in  the  NMS  has  raised  doubts  about  their 
viability under the CAP direct payments, the so called Single Area Payments (SAP). The 
preference of the newly emergent landowners in the 1990s to leave their land in the corporate 
farms  was  linked  to  the  low  level  of  farm  profitability  and  the  high  risk  in  the  general 
economic environment. This was coupled with the fact that many city dwellers received land 
during  the  post-communist  land  reforms  but  did  not  have  skills  and  experience  in  farm 
production  and  management.  The  accession  to  the  EU  and  the  introduction  of  the  CAP 
support, and in particular the SAP, have improved the market conditions in the NMS and 
increased farm incomes. The main question analysed in this paper is whether under these 
circumstances the landowners would still prefer to leave their land in the corporate farms or 
whether a quick disintegration of these organisations will be witnessed. 
There  are  variations  in  the  corporate  farms’  attitude  toward  rent  increases.  Overall,  the 
corporate farm management rarely puts the land rent increase as a future priority.  However, 
larger farms which are more dependent on numerous landowners give a higher priority to the 
use of future profits to reward land factor owners than the smaller farms do. Also, farms that 
trust the policy drive to decoupling and perceive the 2003 CAP reform as irreversible are keen 
to use the profit for rent increases. They realise that the decoupled payments that do not 
require production are easier to be captured by the individual landowners, and that they have 
to share with the factor owners the increase in the value of land due to the capitalisation of 
support.  This  indicates  a  perceived  danger  of  landowners’  withdrawals  under  decoupling. 
Farms that do not think the decoupled payments are credible are more likely to use their profit 
for investment. This means that they do not intend to change their behaviour as they think that 
the decoupled payments and GAEC are temporary policy instruments. The expectations for 
payments linked to production create incentives for investing.  
Overall, the main policy conclusion is that the SAP will induce more landowners to review 
their situation within the corporate farms and to try to capture the capitalisation of the SAP 
through higher rents. However, it is unlikely that they will massively withdraw their land 
from the corporate farms. Therefore, the expected behaviour of landowners does not put the 
very existence of the corporate farms under question, at least within the short- to mid-term 
horizon. However, if this is true on average, financially constrained farms may quickly loose 
their capacity to compete for land in the conditions of an increased land demand which has 
started being observed in Slovakia and the other NMS after the EU accession. Therefore, a 
substantial structural change might be expected within the corporate farm sector with a better 
allocation of land to the more efficient users. 
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